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Is Napster a VCR?
The Implications of Sony for Napster
and Other Internet Technologies
by
STACEY L. DOGAN*

Introduction
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance
between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not
merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce.

1

In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme
Court created the copyright version of the so-called "staple article of
commerce doctrine."'2 Its stated objective was to strike a balance
between the incentive objectives of copyright 3 and the interests of the
* Assistant Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. I am grateful to the
editors of the Hastings Law Journal for organizing this symposium and to the symposium
participants, particularly Dan Burk, Richard Gilbert, and Michael Katz, for helpful
comments. Special thanks to Joseph Liu, Gregg Shapiro, and Deborah Feldman for their
valuable suggestions on this Essay, and to Clayton Meixel for research assistance.
1. Sony Corp. of Am.v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
2. Id.at 439. The Court borrowed the doctrine from patent law, where it had a long
(if somewhat tortured) history as an intermediary between the doctrines of contributory
infringement and patent misuse. See id. at 440 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)); see also Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187-99 (1980).
3. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(stating that the Constitution intends that copyright serve as an "engine of free
expression"); cf.Maureen A. O'Rourke, Evaluating Mistakes in Intellectual PropertyLaw:
Configuring the System to Account for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
167, 170 (2000) (noting competing theoretical justifications for intellectual property, and
concluding that "at least in American law, the leading theory probably still continues to be
a utilitarian one," which "emphasizes the need to provide incentives to the firstcomer to
create while maintaining a viable public domain from which secondcomers may draw in
improving and building on the original work").

[939]

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

public in access to new technology. 4 As defined by the Court, the
doctrine prevents copyright holders from interfering with the sale of
technologies that may be used to infringe, but that also have
"substantial non-infringing uses."'5
Nearly two decades later, we have little idea of what the
copyright staple article of commerce doctrine means. Neither the
Supreme Court nor subsequent lower court decisions have elucidated
what kinds of products or services can qualify as staple articles of
commerce, 6 nor have they provided a framework for deciding
whether such an article has a "substantial non-infringing use."' 7 In the
absence of any such guidance, commentators and scholars differ
profoundly over the scope of indirect copyright infringement8 post9
Sony.
4. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441-42.
5. 1& at 442. More specifically, the doctrine prevents copyright holders from
asserting claims for indirect copyright infringement against sellers of "staple articles of
commerce." Id. at 491-92; see infra notes 8, 30-43.
6. It is not clear, for example, whether the doctrine applies only to goods sold in the
marketplace, or whether it also applies to cases involving ongoing relationships between
the selling and the purchasing party. See infra text accompanying notes 62-82.
7. Some courts have invoked the doctrine after finding only one plausible noninfringing use of the technology, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,
263-64 (5th Cir. 1988), while others have suggested that the defendant must show some
commercially significant use, e.g., Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923,
935 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (staple article of commerce doctrine inapplicable when customers
would not purchase technology for non-infringing use); Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,
597 F. Supp. 5 (C.D. Ill. 1983) (contributory liability against machine vendor turns on
"primary use" of machine). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself gave inconsistent guidance
on the level of non-infringing use required. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (stating that the
standard is satisfied "if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes"; that products "need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses"; that
the "question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially significant
noninfringing uses"; and that the question is whether a "significant number" of uses would
be non-infringing); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021
(2001) (in evaluating whether a technology has a substantial non-infringing use, courts
must consider both current and future non-infringing applications).
8. I use the term "indirect copyright infringement" to refer to the copyright doctrines
under which a party can face liability for infringing acts committed by another. See Sony,
464 U.S. at 435 ("[T]he concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the
broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another."). Courts have identified two such doctrines:
contributory infringement, which requires knowledge of the infringing activity and
substantial participation in it, and vicarious liability, which requires a direct financial
benefit from infringing acts that the defendant had a right and ability to control. See, e.g.,
Gershwin Publ'g Co. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (2d Cir.
1971) (contributory infringement); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d
304,316 (2d Cir. 1963) (vicarious liability). It is unclear whether the Sony doctrine applies
to both types of indirect liability. While the Supreme Court stated its holding in general
terms and referred to the two doctrines interchangeably, it had before it only a claim of
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Nothing has contributed to that discord more than the case
against Napster. 10 Napster offers a product-music file-sharing
software-and a service-a centralized website that connects those
who want to swap music files, the majority of which are swapped
without authorization from the copyright owner." Napster tests the
bounds of Sony in multiple ways. Unlike a VCR manufacturer,
Napster does not merely sell a "piece of equipment"' 2 to infringers; it
maintains an ongoing relationship with its customers and plays a
continuing role in their alleged infringement.' 3 Its so-called "staple
article," moreover, consists of a combination of goods and services
4
whose value lies primarily in their promotion of infringement.'
Napster views these differences as irrelevant to its eligibility
under the staple article of commerce doctrine, 5 and it has drawn

support for its position from an impressive array of scholars.' 6 In
some ways, the company's argument has considerable appeal; an

contributory infringement, and the Ninth Circuit has held that the rule only applies to such
cases. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2001).
9. See, e.g., Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors in Support
of Reversal, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The
balance rests on the side of permitting new technology, not stifling it."); Ariel B. Taitz,
Note, Removing Road Blocks Along the Information Superhighway: Facilitating the
Dissemination of New Technology by Changing the Law of Contributory Copyright
Infringement,64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 133 (1996) (proposing the imposition of liability on
makers of technology with "non-trivial infringing uses"); see generally Dan L. Burk,
Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.121, 176 (1999) ("Under the Sony
standard, development of technology that has no purpose but to facilitate infringement
will be penalized as socially wasteful; but the standard will not discourage the
development of technology that may have other social benefits, even if incidentally used
[for illegitimate purposes].").
10. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in part,rev'd in part,239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
11. Id. at 917.
12. Sony, 464 U.S. at 436.
13. Napster,114 F. Supp. 2d at 917; see also Napster,239 F.3d at 1022.
14. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 917 (describing program for unsigned musicians-a
non-infringing use of Napster's service-as an "afterthought"). Compare Sony, 464 U.S.
at 423 (finding that VCR's "primary use" was non-infringing).
15. Napster also contends that its users' exchange of music files is protected by the
Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1996), and the fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1996). Even if those arguments failed, however, Napster contends that its service
has a "substantial non-infringing use" because it allows the exchange of music files by
unknown artists and others who willingly make their songs available to the service.
16. Eighteen prominent copyright law professors, for example, signed an amicus brief
with the Ninth Circuit in the Napster case, contending that Napster falls within the Sony
exception. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors in Support of Reversal,
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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isolated reading of some of the Supreme Court's language 17 suggests
that the Court would insulate any technology with a plausible noninfringing use. Yet, in my view, such an interpretation, if adopted by
the courts, would expand the "staple article of commerce" doctrine in
ways neither contemplated by the Supreme Court nor consistent with
its core objectives in Sony.
As the opening quotation above makes clear, 18 the Supreme
Court did not craft the staple article of commerce doctrine merely to
insulate new technologies. Its objective was to strike a balance
between the incentive structure of copyright, 19 on the one hand, and
the integrity of "substantially unrelated areas of commerce," on the
other. The Court recognized that both of these interests ultimately
serve the public-the first, by encouraging creative expression, 20 and
the second, by protecting consumers' unimpeded access to product
markets.21 Accordingly, the Court held that copyright owners may
not use infringement suits to leverage control over "substantially
unrelated" markets,22 either by eliminating such markets altogether
or by transferring control to the copyright holder and thereby
interfering with incentives in those markets.23
The converse,
however, must also be true: if liability in a particular case would not
interfere with a market "substantially unrelated" to copyright
infringement, the staple article of commerce doctrine has no role to
play.
This Essay advocates a context-specific approach to the staple
article of commerce doctrine that invokes it only when necessary to
protect consumers' access to markets substantially unrelated to
copyright infringement. This market-access paradigm, which follows
17. E.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (stating that the product "need merely be capable of
substantial non-infringing uses").
18. See supra text accompanying note 1.
19. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. Intellectual property laws are "intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors." Id. at 429.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 440 (noting "public interest in access to ... article[s] of commerce").
22. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; see also Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ'g Co., 158
F.3d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1998) (invoking staple article of commerce doctrine when plaintiff
"has a thin copyright in its compilations, which it seeks to leverage to protect its
pagination (an element of its compilation that is unprotected altogether)").
23. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACrICE § 6.1.2 (2d ed. Supp.

2000) (arguing that when equipment has non-infringing applications, holding its
manufacturer liable for contributory infringement "may enable the copyright owner to
influence the price and availability of goods that are not directly connected to its
copyrighted work. If liability is too broad it may improperly curb incentives to invent new
equipment or material").
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from the Supreme Court's normative goals in Sony, has implications
for both stages of the staple article of commerce inquiry: (1) whether
to invoke the doctrine at all, and (2) assuming it applies, whether the
article at issue has a substantial non-infringing use. For the doctrine
need not apply if an injunction against infringement would not
endanger non-infringing applications. And if a product is so
integrally related to infringement that a market for it would never
have developed absent infringement, there is no "substantially
unrelated" market with which courts must not interfere.
At its core, Sony is about preventing copyright holders from
interfering with consumers' ability to make non-infringing uses of
technology. This Essay examines that objective and proposes one
possible framework for pursuing it in a way that does the least
unnecessary injury to copyright incentives. I do not pretend that my
specific approach offers the only-or even the best-means of
achieving the Supreme Court's goals in Sony. My aim is more
modest: to identify the normative goals of the staple article of
commerce doctrine and to explore their implications. In Part I, I
examine Sony's core market-access objectives. Part II introduces the
Napster technology and the lawsuit between Napster and the
recording industry. Part III explores the implications of Sony for
Napster and similar defendants.
I. Sony and Market Access
The Supreme Court in Sony faced a question of first impression:
Can a manufacturer of copying equipment be liable under copyright
law when purchasers use the equipment to infringe? The case
involved the Betamax VCR, but it could just as well have concerned
the photocopying machine, 24 printing press,2 cassette recorder,26 or
24. A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating
that Sony "applies to 'staple articles or commodities of commerce,' such as VCR's,
photocopiers, and blank, standard-length cassette tapes").
25. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 (2000) ("Certainly, it would be
absurd to hold the manufacturer and seller of a printing press liable as contributory
copyright infringers because the buyer uses such press for infringing purposes.").
26. Cf. Napster, 948 F. Supp. at 1456 (stating that Sony "applies to 'staple articles or
commodities of commerce,' such as VCR's, photocopiers, and blank, standard-length
cassettes," but "would not extend to products," such as time-loaded cassettes, that were
"specifically manufactured for counterfeiting activity"); RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas
& Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773,781 (8th Cir. 1988) and RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., 594
F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D. N.Y. 1984) (holding manufacturers of commercial audio cassette
duplicators vicariously liable for in-store duplication of copyrighted works where they
retained ownership and control over machines).
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any other technology that automates the process of replicating
creative expression.2 7 The Sony plaintiffs, who owned the copyright
to certain television programs, charged Sony with contributory
infringement for selling the copying equipment with knowledge that
its users would copy the plaintiffs' programs.28 The Ninth Circuit
agreed: because VCRs were sold "for the primary purpose of
reproducing television programming" without permission from
copyright owners, the court found its manufacturer legally
responsible for the buyers' infringement.2 9
The Supreme Court-by bare majority 3 -invoked the "staple
article of commerce" doctrine to reverse. The Court first reviewed
the case law on contributory and vicarious copyright infringement,
and found no prior case imposing liability based solely on the sale of
equipment that customers might use to infringe. 31 Patent law, in
contrast, specifically contemplates such liability,32 but exempts any
"staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use. '33 The Court found the rationale behind this rule
applicable to the copyright context and thus extended the staple
article of commerce doctrine to copyright law. Accordingly, because

27. Cf Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 (reviewing ways in which copyright law has historically
responded to new technologies).
28. Id. at 439. The plaintiffs had also asserted claims for vicarious infringement, as
well as claims of direct infringement against retailers who had allegedly infringed while
demonstrating the Betamax machines. Id.at 435 n.17; see also Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding in favor of plaintiffs on contributory
infringement claim only).
29. Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d at 975.
30. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion on behalf of himself and Justices
Burger, Brennan, White, and O'Connor. Sony, 464 U.S. at 418-56. Justice Blackmun's
dissent, which disagreed with the majority on both fair use and the "staple article of
commerce" doctrine, was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist. Id. at 456500.
31. Id. at 439 ("If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest
on the fact that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that its
customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.
There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of liability on such a
theory.").
32. The Patent Act defines "contributory infringement" as the sale of "a component
or patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention," with knowledge that the component, material, or apparatus was "especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 35 U.S.C.
§ 271.
33. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)).
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the VCR had a "substantial noninfringing use," 34 the Court held that
the Ninth Circuit had erred in finding its sellers legally responsible for
35
the infringing applications.
Although the Court failed to provide clear definitions of "staple
article of commerce" and "substantial non-infringing use," it offered
something arguably more useful: 36 a principled account of the need
for the new doctrine and the role that it should play in future
copyright cases. The doctrine was necessary, said the Court, to
protect the public's right to engage in areas of commerce
"substantially unrelated" to infringement. 37 While the Court did not
elaborate on the meaning of "substantially unrelated areas of
commerce," 38 it is quite clear that it did not intend to give wholesale
inmmunity to all new technologies. To the contrary, the Court

expressly recognized that liability of equipment manufacturers may
sometimes be necessary to give "adequate protection" to copyright
holders.3 9 In other situations, however, the need for integrity in
unrelated product markets would outweigh the harm to copyright
incentives caused by the use of such products. 40 Thus, the staple
article of commerce doctrine must balance the need for competition
in-and consumers' unimpeded access to-such "substantially
unrelated" markets against the copyright owner's "legitimate demand

for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of [its] statutory
'41

monopoly."

34. Id-at 442. In another portion of the opinion, the Supreme Court held that
unauthorized "time-shifting"-the recording of television broadcasts for later home
viewing-constituted a fair use under the copyright laws. Id. at 447-56. Because the
combination of authorized and unauthorized time-shifting constituted the "primary use [of
the VCR] for most owners," id.at 423, the Betamax easily satisfied the "substantial noninfringing use" standard.
35. Id. at 442.
36. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (on rules versus standards); cf.Burk, supra note 9, at 123
(arguing that ambiguous standards, rather than purportedly clear rules, may have a
positive effect on bargaining in cyberspace context).
37. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d
693, 707 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the Supreme Court adopted the staple article of
commerce doctrine "to prevent copyright holders from leveraging the copyrights in their
original work to control distribution of (and obtain royalties from) products that might be
used incidentally for infringement, but that had substantial non-infringing uses").
38. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
39. Id.("[T]he contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition that
adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to look beyond actual
duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities that make such
duplication possible.").
40. Id.
41. Id.
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When applying Sony, then, courts should ask whether liability
would impede competition in-and therefore inhibit consumer access
to42-some identifiable market that is substantially unrelated to
infringement. This underlying market-access objective, rather than
any fixed formulation of a staple article of commerce, should guide
courts in deciding whether and how to apply Sony. For the staple
article of commerce doctrine must mediate between incentive and
competition, rather than automatically favoring either one.43 This
balance must affect the decisions whether to invoke Sony at all and
whether, assuming Sony applies, a particular technology has a
The context of a defendant's
substantial non-infringing use.
relationship to the direct infringer and to the infringement-including

the avoidability of infringement and the viability of a market for noninfringing uses-must inevitably play a role in those determinations.

H. Napster
44
Napster is a website that (1) distributes file-sharing software
and (2) serves as a clearinghouse to connect users who want to
42. Traditional economic theory posits that competitive markets will provide the
lowest prices and the broadest access to consumers. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231, 248 (1951) ("The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the
value of competition."); see also Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
695 (1978) ("The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in
a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and
durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity
to select among alternative offers.").
43. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; see also id. at 429 (noting the "difficult balance between the
interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand"); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) ("The policy of free competition runs deep in our law....
But the policy of stimulating invention that underlies the entire patent system runs no less
deep. And the doctrine of contributory infringement.., can be of crucial importance in
ensuring that the endeavors and investments of the inventor do not go unrewarded.").
44. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1011-12 (9th Cir. 2001). To use
Napster's technology, a user must first download Napster's MusicShare software, which is
available free of charge from the Napster website, and must register by selecting a user
name and password that give access to the Napster network. Each time that user
thereafter signs onto the network, she has the option of making her files available to other
Napster users. If she so chooses, the MusicShare software verifies the availability and
format of her music files and uploads the file names to the Napster servers, which then list
them as files available for download by other users. Id. Users seeking to download these
files can locate them either by using Napster's search engine or by using MusicShare's
"hotlist" utility. "Hotlist" allows users to identify particular users from whom they have
obtained files in the past and to know, at any time, (1) whether such users are logged onto
Napster, and (2) if so, what files they are offering. Id. at 1012; see also
http://www.napster.com/help/win/manual/hotlist.html (last visited Jan. 20,2001).
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exchange music files over the Internet.45 After downloading the
Napster software, a user can log onto Napster and make available to
other Napster users any MP346 files stored on her hard drive. The file
names will then appear in a directory searchable by anyone
simultaneously logged onto the Napster system. If a user locates a
desired MP3 file in the directory, she may request a download directly
from the user offering the file.47 Napster therefore provides both a
product-its file-sharing software-and a service-a centralized
website that connects users and provides information about music
files available on its network.
Napster's launch in mid-1999 caused an uproar in the recording
industry and among some recording artists, who feared that largescale music swapping would cut into the market for music sales&a In
December 1999, a consortium of music copyright holders 49 sued
Napster for contributory and vicarious liability, and after a
preliminary injunction hearing, Judge Marilyn Patel ruled in
plaintiffs' favor on both counts. She entered a preliminary injunction
barring Napster "from engaging in, or facilitating others in copying,
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs'
recordings.., without
copyrighted musical compositions and '5sound
0
owner.
rights
the
of
express permission
Judge Patel rejected Napster's argument that Sony insulated it
from liability because its file-sharing technology had a "substantial
45. Napster,239 F.3d at 1011-12.
46. MP3 stands for MPEG-3, a condensed digital format for storing audio recordings
that makes it easy to transport them over communications networks. Id. at 1011.
Computer users can convert ordinary audio CDs into MP3 format through a compression
process known as "ripping," after which they can make their files available on the Napster
service. Id.
47. Id at 1011-12. The files therefore do not pass through Napster's servers in the
course of traveling from one user to another. It is this feature-the trading of files directly
from user to user-that gives Napster its "peer-to-peer" moniker. See A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affid in part,rev'd in part,239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
48. Courtney Macavinta, Recording Industry Sues Music Start-Up, Cites Black Market,
CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 7, 1999, at http:l/news.cnet.comnews/0-1005-200-1485841.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2001) (quoting Recording Industry of America executive: Napster is
"trying to build a business on the backs of artists and copyright owners"); see also John
Borland, Napster, Universities Sued by Metallica, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 13, 2000, at
http:l/news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1694163.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2001) (quoting
complaint filed by the band Metallica: "Napster has built a business based on large-scale
piracy").
49. The plaintiffs in Napster include copyright owners of both sound recordings and
underlying musical compositions. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d.
896,900 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
50. Id. at 927.
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non-infringing use." 51 While recognizing that at least some musicians
had authorized swaps of their music files on Napster, Judge Patel
found Sony inapplicable because, among other things, Napster
exercised "continuing control" over its service. 52 She cited its
screening of non-MP3 files, as well as its termination of certain user
accounts, as evidence of such continuing control.53 Moreover, even if
Sony had applied, it would not have exempted Napster from liability,
because non-infringing uses "may not represent a substantial or
54
commercially significant aspect" of the service.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling on liability, but
remanded for entry of a narrower injunction. The court agreed with
the district court that Napster had knowingly contributed to
infringement by its users, and had financially benefited from acts of
infringement that it could have controlled.5 5 It found error, however,
in the court's "plac[ing] on Napster the entire burden of ensuring that
no 'copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing' of
plaintiffs' works occur on the system. ' 56 It instructed the district
court, on remand, to "place the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice
to Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works
available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to
disable access to the offending content." After receiving such notice,
however, Napster must "polic[e] the system within the limits of the
57
system."
The Ninth Circuit gave a somewhat elliptical treatment of Sony.
It began with an observation, in dicta, that the district court had
misconstrued the meaning of "substantial non-infringing use" by
focusing narrowly on current uses of the Napster system.5
51. Id. at 912.
52. According to Judge Patel:
In Sony, the defendant's participation did not extend past manufacturing and
selling the VCRs: "[t]he only contact between Sony and the users of the
Betamax... occurred at the moment of sale." Here, in contrast, Napster, Inc.
maintains and supervises an integrated system that users must access to upload or
download files.... Given defendant's control over the service, as opposed to
mere manufacturing or selling, the existence of a potentially unobjectionable use
like space-shifting does not defeat plaintiffs' claims.
I. at 916-17 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 438).
53. Id. at 918, 920-21.
54. Id. at 917.
55. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1019-25 (9th Cir. 2001).
56. Id at 1027.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1021 ("The district court improperly confined the use analysis to current
uses, ignoring the system's capabilities. Consequently, the district court placed undue
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Nonetheless, it agreed that Sony was inapplicable. The court viewed
Sony as a case about knowledge, in which the Supreme Court invoked
the staple article of commerce doctrine to avoid imputing knowledge
of infringement to a manufacturer based on the mere capacity of its
equipment to infringe. 59 As a result, the Ninth Circuit found Sony
inapposite, not merely because Napster had the ability to control its
system, but because it had refused to exercise such control after
60
receiving actual knowledge of infringement on its service.
On remand, Judge Patel entered an injunction requiring the
plaintiffs to give Napster notice of particular infringing music files,
after which Napster had three business days to begin searching for
those files and blocking their sharing on the Napster service. 61

Il.

Implications of the Market Access Paradigm

A. The Relevance of Ongoing Control

Because Sony itself involved a one-time product sale, 62 it did not
address a core issue presented in Napster: whether the staple article
of commerce doctrine applies to a defendant whose continuing

relationship with the direct infringer gives it at least the theoretical
ability to prevent acts of infringement as they occur. 63 The district
weight on the proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future
noninfringing use.") (citations omitted); see also id. ("[A]bsent any specific information
which identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the
exchange of copyrighted material.").
59. Id at 1020-21.
60. Id 1021-22 ("The record supports the district court's finding that Napster has
actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available on its system, that it could
block access to the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to
remove the material."); see also id. at 1027. The court found the staple article of
commerce doctrine wholly inapplicable to the plaintiff's vicarious infringement claims,
pointing out that the Supreme Court in Sony had before it only claims for contributory
infringement. Id. at 1022.
61. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. C 99-05183, C 00-1369, 2001 WL 227083,
at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12,2001) ("Within three (3) business days of receipt of reasonable
notice of infringing files, Napster shall affirmatively search the names of all files being
made available by all users at the time those users log on (i.e., prior to the names of files
being included in the Napster index) and prevent the downloading, uploading,
transmitting or distributing of the noticed copyrighted sound recordings.").
62. 464 U.S. 417, 437-38 (1984) (emphasizing that Sony had no post-sale relationship
with Betamax purchasers and had no role in the delivery of infringing content).
63. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
The district court found that Napster not only offered a service that facilitated
infringement, but also actively encouraged its users to infringe. Id. If liability were based
solely on that active encouragement, Napster could not rely on the staple article of
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court in Napster found Sony inapplicable to defendants that exercise
any ongoing "control" over direct infringers. 64 The Ninth Circuit
found control relevant, but only when coupled with actual knowledge
of particular infringing files on the Napster service. Napster and its
supporters, in contrast, describe such control as irrelevant to the Sony
5
inquiry.6
When viewed from a market-access perspective, the ability to
control is relevant, although in a somewhat different way than
described by either Judge Patel or the Ninth Circuit. 66 Because the
rationale for Sony is to avoid burdening consumers' access to markets
substantially unrelated to infringement, it follows that the staple
article of commerce rule should apply if-and only if-such access
would be threatened by holding a defendant responsible for
infringing use of a technology. 67 If liability would not impede any
such markets, Sony should not apply. Accordingly, if the nature of a
party's control over its users makes it feasible and essentially costless
6
to distinguish between infringing and non-infringing applications, 8
the law should require it to do so. 69 Liability in such a case would not
commerce doctrine to insulate its behavior, but an injunction might be limited to the
active inducement, rather than to the file-sharing service itself. See, e.g., Dawson v. Rohm
& Haas, 599 F.2d 685, 703 n.24 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 176 (stating that the remedy
when someone sells an article of commerce and actively induces infringement is injunction
against active inducement, rather than against sales).
64. Napster,114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
65. Napster's Opening Brief at 65-66, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors at 6-7, Napster,239
F.3d 1004.
66. Judge Patel found Sony inapplicable because, among other things, Napster
"exercises ongoing control over its service." Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916. She focused
on generalized control, and did not make a specific finding as to its ability to "control"
infringement by distinguishing between authorized and unauthorized exchanges of music
files. Id. at 922 (acknowledging possibility that Napster may not have the ability to
"separate the infringing and non-infringing aspects of its service"). The Ninth Circuit, in
contrast, emphasized the importance of Napster's ability to block access to specific
infringing files after receiving notice of their presence on the Napster system. Napster,239
F.3d at 1022, 1024, 1027.
67. Cf Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1525, 1538 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(noting that in the patent context, "the proper test to determine if a device that can
practice non-infringing methods, but allows practice of a patented method, is a staple, is
that the practice of the patented method must be incidental and necessary due to
technological limitations").
68. "Knowledge" of particular infringing content, as discussed by the Ninth Circuit,
bears upon this inquiry, because it affects the ease with which a party can distinguish
between infringing and non-infringing uses. Napster,239 F.3d at 1021-22.
69. If, for example, a defendant contributes to infringement, not by making a one-time
sale of equipment, but by permitting others to use its equipment under its supervision, it
has at least the theoretical ability to withhold such permission before every act of copying,
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70

technology, and would promote the interest of preserving copyright
incentives. If, on the other hand, preventing the infringing uses would
either cut off or substantially impair users' enjoyment of the noninfringing applications, the staple article of commerce doctrine should
come into play. The fact that the doctrine applies in such a case does
not end the inquiry, for a defendant may nonetheless face liability if
its technology has no "substantial non-infringing use." It simply
means that the court must proceed to the next stage of analysis.
This context-specific approach to the applicability of Sony is
more nuanced than that proposed by the parties or the courts in
Napster. On the one hand, the plaintiffs-and Judge Patel-would
avoid such a fact-specific inquiry into Napster's ability to distinguish
between infringing and non-infringing uses in favor of a more

mechanical, yea-or-nea inquiry into only whether Napster exercised
any control over the use of its service. 71 Because Napster "maintains
and supervises" its file-sharing service, 72 this approach finds Sony
inapplicable. 73 Napster and its advocates, on the other hand, appear
to propose an equally inflexible rule: that courts may not tamper with
thereby eliminating infringement without interfering with non-infringing uses. The
defendant in RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc-, 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. N.Y. 1984), for
example, was a cassette-copying service that duplicated music cassettes at the request of
customers. While the court found the defendants liable for direct infringement, it entered
an injunction that also applied to "infringement involving defendant's machines but not its
employees. It must not only forbid defendant's employees from making the copies but
also prevent defendant from selling [the cassette tapes at issue] to customers who
defendants know or have reasonable cause to believe intend to use the machine to copy
plaintiffs' copyrighted recordings." Id. at 339. The court found Sony inapplicable because
the defendant in RCA was "aware of each use of the machine and [was] in a position to
prevent such use by withholding sale of the cassette." Id. at 339.
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster could police its service by searching
for infringing file names and cutting off users who made these files available. 239 F.3d at
1024 ("Napster... has the ability to locate infringing material listed on its search indices,
and the right to terminate users' access to the system.").
70. See RCA, 594 F. Supp. at 339 ("It need have no impact on sales of cassettes for
legitimate copying for defendant to cease selling to infringing customers."); cf
RCAIAriola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 780 (8th Cir. 1988)
(upholding injunction requiring retailers to control access to blank tapes, to inspect the
originals their customers proposed to copy, and to insert the blank into the machine).
71. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916-17; see also Plaintiffs/Appellees' Brief at 42-44,
Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; Brief of Amicus Curiae Business Software Alliance at 7-11,
Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (stating that the fact that Napster cuts off specific users about
whom rights holders complain "is tantamount to an admission that defendant can, and
sometimes does, police its service").
72. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
73. Judge Patel also held that the Napster service had no substantial non-infringing
use that would insulate it from liability even if Sony applied. See infra note 93.
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technology that has plausible non-infringing uses even if a
defendant's ongoing stewardship of the technology would make it
feasible to distinguish between infringing and non-infringing
applications. 74 The Ninth Circuit adopts a compromise of sorts, but
the opinion's exclusive focus on knowledge seems to suggest that
parties must do everything within their power-regardless of the
expense-to eliminate known infringement on their system. 75
While each of these views can find support in certain passages in

Sony, 76 none accomplishes the ultimate goal proclaimed by the
Supreme Court: to protect consumers' ability to make non-infringing
uses of technology, while at the same time preserving copyright
incentives to the extent possible.77 Napster's approach uncritically
74. See, e.g., Plaintiffs/Appelees' Brief at 65-66, Napster,239 F.3d 1004 (arguing that
under Sony, courts may not require defendants to "reconfigure" devices "to exclude the
possibilities of non-infringing uses"); Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors at
6-8, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (describing "ongoing control exception" as "groundless").
Napster also vociferously denies that it could feasibly eliminate the infringing uses
without dismantling its entire file-sharing service. Plaintiffs/Appelees' Brief at 43-51,
Napster, 239 F.3d 1004. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, pointing out that Napster could
search its file index to identify and eliminate infringing files. Since Judge Patel entered
her modified preliminary injunction, the parties have squabbled over the feasibility of the
injunction and the adequacy of Napster's efforts to comply. See, e.g., Lee Gomes, Record
Industry Files Court PapersSaying Napster Isn't Effectively Blocking Music, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 28, 2001, at B5.
75. See Napster,239 F.3d at 1021 (finding Sony inapplicable because "the evidentiary
record here supported the district court's finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail in
establishing that Napster knew or had reason to know of its users' infringement of
plaintiffs' copyrights").
76. In several places in the opinion, for example, the Court appeared to imply that its
doctrine would apply only to one-time sales. The Court described as "manifestly just" the
imposition of liability in cases "involving an ongoing relationship between the direct
infringer and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred." Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984). In such cases, said
the Court, "the 'contributory' infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted
works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright
owner." Id. The Court approved of liability against such defendants, as compared to
Sony, whose "only contact [with] the users of the Betamax... occurred at the moment of
sale." Id.; see also id. at 440 (noting that public interest is implicated "[w]hen a charge of
contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that
is used by the purchaser to infringe").
Napster's position, on the other hand, also finds some support, although it is arguably
more muted. See, e.g., id. at 440 (staple article of commerce doctrine is based on "public
interest in access" to equipment with infringing and non-infringing uses).
77. The two extreme approaches could also lead to absurd results. As Napster's amici
point out, a test that looks only at the general ability to control could arguably result in
liability against the lessor of a photocopy machine, based on its maintenance and servicing
of the equipment. Brief of Anicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors at 8, Napster,239
F.3d 1004. At the other extreme, a rule that prohibits courts from ever requiring
reconfiguration of technology with non-infringing uses would create an incentive for
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tips the balance in favor of defendants, even when unnecessary to

preserve access to any legitimate market. 78 The plaintiffs' proposal,
on the other hand-and, arguably, the approach of both courtswould impose significant burdens on technological development, by
requiring defendants who maintain a relationship with their users to
police users' infringement regardless of the cost.79 The alternative
framework proposed above makes an initial attempt at a compromise:
it invokes Sony when necessary-but only when necessary-to
80
prevent interference with a technology's non-infringing functions.
B. Substantial Non-Infringing Uses Under Sony

The market-access paradigm 8' is perhaps most useful in the
second stage of the staple article of commerce inquiry: evaluating
whether a technology has enough non-infringing applications to
escape liability. By viewing this question from the perspective of
consumers seeking access to markets "substantially unrelated to
infringement," courts can develop a more principled and coherent
methodology than one based on any arbitrary benchmark for
"substantial non-infringing use. '82
manufacturers to package infringing and non-infringing applications together and thereby
protect themselves from liability by claiming that any other result would require them to
"redesign" their systems. Cf. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp.
1409, 1424 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,263-64 (5th
Cir. 1988).
78. Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors at 8, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004
("Notwithstanding that a technological tool facilitates copyright infringement, the
'Progress of Science and the Useful Arts' precludes an injunction so long as the tool is
capable of substantial non-infringing uses. The balance rests on the side of permitting new
technology, not stifling it.").
79. In places, the Ninth Circuit appeared to suggest that the cost of eliminating
infringement should play a role in determining a defendant's indirect liability. By finding
Sony inapplicable to cases involving actual knowledge of infringement, for example, the
court limited liability to defendants with enough information to stop infringement before
it occurred. And the court went further to suggest that only defendants who "could" have
used that information to block infringement, but chose not to, will face liability. Napster,
239 F.3d at 1021-22.
80. Questions remain, of course, about how much cost a defendant must incur to root
out infringement. I do not propose to resolve that issue, other than to suggest that the
costs must not substantially burden non-infringing uses of the system.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
82. Courts and commentators-and, indeed, the Supreme Court itself in Sony-have
offered a wide assortment of standards for "substantial non-infringing use." See, e.g., Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (stating that the
standard is satisfied "if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes"; that products "need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses"; that
the "question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially significant
noninfringing uses"; and that the court "need not explore all the different potential uses of
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To some extent, the hyperbole surrounding Napster has
displaced measured reflection about the real consumer interests at
stake. Because the case pits "big business" against what at least
began as a grassroots venture, 83 because liability would deprive
individuals of free music that they want,84 because the recording
industry has a well-deserved reputation for exploiting artists, 85 and

the machine and determine whether or not they would constitute infringement.... [but
rather] need only consider whether.., a significant number of them would be
noninfringing"); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (question is whether system is "capable of" noninfringing uses, now or in the future); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d
896, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that Sony requires "commercially significant" noninfringing uses); id. at 917 (noting that non-infringing uses are not substantial when they
were "an afterthought, not a major aspect" of defendant's business plan); Atari, Inc. v.
JS&A Group., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding no substantial non-infringing
use when "[i]t strains credulity to assert that customers would spend" the cost of the
device for non-infringing applications); Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network
Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 846 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that Sony does not apply, despite
possible legal uses for devices, when defendants "utilized and advertised these devices
primarily as infringement aids and not for legitimate, noninfringing uses"); cf Vault Corp.
v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding product "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses" without any inquiry into magnitude of such uses, either
absolutely or relative to infringing applications). See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT
LAw AND PRAcTIcE § 6.1.2, at 6:14-15 (2d ed. Supp. 2000) ("[S]o long as the fundamental
requirements of knowledge and concert of action are met, contributory infringement
should be found any time the materials or equipment in issue have a substantial infringing
use in copying the plaintiffs work."); Taitz, supra note 9 (proposing liability on makers of
technology with "non-trivial infringing uses"). See generally Burk, supranote 9, at 176.
83. Macavinta, supra note 48 (quoting Napster CEO: "We're this tiny company
caught between two industries: the Net and music industry.").
The Napster software was created by "a college student who wanted to facilitate
music-swapping by his roommate." Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902. By early 2001,
however, the integrated Napster file-sharing service claimed over 56 million subscribers.
Matt Richtel, Tech Briefing: Record Label Settles with Napster,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001,
at C4. As Judge Patel pointed out, Napster "has never been a non-profit organization."
Napster,114 F. Supp. 2d at 902. It has amassed millions of dollars in funding from venture
capitalists and from recording industry giant Bertelsmann AG, which recently announced
that Napster will soon convert into a fee-based service. See Germany's Bertelsmann Says
It Plans To Offer Subscriptions to Napster, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2001, at A4. But see
Andrew Morse, Where's Napster'sPay Service? Don't Ask, THE STANDARD, Feb. 5, 2001,

available at http:llwww.thestandard.comlarticle/display/0,1151,21904,00.html (Napster
CEO Hank Barry denies that Napster has agreed on a time frame for initiating fees).
84. Napster argues that its users' exchange of copyrighted music files is protected by
both the fair use doctrine and the Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1008. See
Napster,114 F. Supp. 2d at 900. Both Judge Patel and the Ninth Circuit dismissed these
arguments and held that Napster users infringe when they trade music files without
authorization. See 239 F.3d at 1014-19, 1024-25; 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-916 & n.19.
85. See, e.g., Courtney Love, Courtney Love Does the Math, SALON, June 14, 2000, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/index.html (last visited Feb. 8,2001); cf.
Andy Sullivan, Hatch Urges Industry to Keep Napster Path Open, REUTERS, Jan. 10, 2001,
availableat http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/010110/n10485003.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2001).
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because an injunction might derail at least one implementation of a

new technology, 86 Napster has a strong psychological advantage with
the public.87
Yet to conclude, based on these apparent equities, that Sony
must insulate the Napster technology is to overlook other interests at
stake-interests that are perhaps more subtle, but equally important
to the long-term welfare of both artists and the consuming public. As
the Supreme Court recognized in Sony, our intellectual property
system is based on the notion that economic incentives drive creative
expression.88 When this incentive objective conflicts with some other
86. Since the district court issued its revised preliminary injunction in February 2001,
Napster has continued to operate and has made efforts to screen infringing files. See
Gomes, supra note 75. Assuming that a permanent injunction ultimately enters, the
company's long-term prospects are less clear. See Lee Gomes, Napster Is Told to End
Violations Quickly, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7,2001, at A3 ("A settlement with the whole record
industry may be Napster's only hope for staying open, though many industry observers
said the chance of such a deal was by now remote."). Even if an injunction did shut
Napster down, however, it would almost certainly not put an end to file-sharing software
as such. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001)
("We are bound to follow Sony, and will not impute the requisite level of knowledge to
Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe
plaintiffs' copyrights."); see also George Anders, From Small Computers a Mighty Power
Grows, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,2001, at A15 (reviewing ANDY ORAM, ED., PEER-TO-PEER
(2001)) (discussing opportunities and challenges presented by decentralized peer-to-peer
services).
87. Editoriak Napster Agonistes, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2000, at A46 ("There will
always be Luddites trying to throw themselves in the path of something new, but their
doomful predictions have been confounded by the willingness of people to consume
greater quantities of whatever can be produced and distributed more cheaply."); compare
Paul Kedrosky, Napster Should be PlayingJailhouseRock, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2000, at
A22 ("Let's be blunt: Napster-style file-sharing is theft. But for some reason
commentators don't see it that way.... Commentators are falling all over themselves
saying that the forces Napster has set loose cannot be stopped.").
88. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(explaining that intellectual property protection "is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward"); see also Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (explaining that the
Constitution intends that copyright serve as an "engine of free expression"); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1, cI. 8.
Some commentators have argued that the incentive justification does not support,
strong, exclusive rights in intellectual property because authors would have a sufficient
incentive under a system which merely covered their cost of producing expression. See,
e.g., Burk, supra note 9, at 133-34 (1999) ("It is by no means clear that a property right
which appropriates all the value of the work to the creator is necessary to induce creation
of the work; presumably, the creator would be prompted to create if he received a right
that ensured he could at least cover his costs."); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyrights in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (questioning necessity of copyright law as incentive for book
production). Compare Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright
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core value-as it did in Sony--courts must find an accommodation

between the competing interests. But courts should not uncritically
accept claims of such conflict; to the contrary, they must scrutinize
them, in order to ensure that incentives are compromised only when
necessary to accommodate a valid competing goal.
The Supreme Court in Sony clearly identified the interest
promoted by the staple article of commerce doctrine: to protect
markets "substantially unrelated" to infringement from meddling by
copyright holders. 89 The doctrine does not insulate technology
blindly, but protects independent markets against incursions by
copyright owners. The doctrine imposes no affirmative obligation on
copyright holders to create technology markets, either directly or
through subsidization.90 Yet that is exactly what would happen if
courts applied the staple article of commerce doctrine to any
technology with a plausible non-infringing use, without any inquiry
into whether that use alone might justify the technology's
development or commercialization.
This analysis suggests one possible approach for deciding
whether a product or service has enough non-infringing uses to
qualify as a staple article of commerce. Rather than inquiring into
the raw amount of non-infringing uses, courts evaluating a
technology's "substantial non-infringing use" should ask whether an
injunction would interfere with consumers' access to a product or
service for which a market would likely have developed in the
absence of infringement. "Substantial" for purposes of Sony should
mean, at least, that the non-infringing use would alone justify the
development and distribution of the product;91 otherwise, the public is
Protectionfor Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100
(1971).
89. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
90. This is not to say that the law should never allow infringing uses to subsidize noninfringing markets. The clear implication of Sony is that such subsidization will occur
when a technology qualifies as a staple article of commerce. Accepting infringement as a
necessary incident to the continued availability of non-infringing technologies, however, is
quite different than holding that markets should be created based exclusively on such
subsidies.
Precisely how courts should evaluate whether a non-infringing market would have
developed is beyond the scope of this Essay. One possibility would be to focus on the net
economic surplus from a technology's non-infringing uses, as proposed by Professors
Gilbert and Katz.
91. Courts should consider both existing demand and near-term future demand in
making this determination. Cf Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592
(1994) (explaining that in fair use determination, "market for potential derivative uses
includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license
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not being deprived of a neutral staple, but of a product that is made
possible solely by infringement. This approach appropriately frames
the inquiry as whether a plaintiff is indeed trying to control an
essentially unrelated market, or if it is seeking, instead, to prevent a
technology that owes its very existence to infringement.

If the

former, Sony requires protection of the technology; if the latter,
insulating the defendant would injure copyright incentives without
serving the economic interests on which the staple article of

commerce doctrine is based. 92
In

evaluating

substantial

non-infringing

use

under

this

framework, courts must consider the defendant's product as a whole
93 If a court reached
rather than focusing on a single component of it.
94
this inquiry in Napster, for example, it would ask whether noninfringing demand would justify the particular file-sharing service
offered by Napster-a centralized music file-sharing service with
multiple servers and all of its special features. 95 While Napster's
others to develop"); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir.
1994) ("[Cjourts consider traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets when
examining and assessing a secondary use's 'effect upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work."') (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)).
92. While no court has fully elaborated this approach to "substantial non-infringing
use," a few have applied something resembling it, in both copyright and patent contexts.
See, e.g., Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1953) (in rejecting staple
article of commerce defense in patent case when testing and commercial development was
directed to infringing uses, stating that "whatever utility they had for noninfringing use,...
it is plain from a factual standpoint that this was a limited use of little practical
consequence in contrast to the number employed" in connection with infringement); see
also Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5,8 (N.D. 111. 1983).
93. Cf Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that in patent context, defendant's "attempted limitation of the
staple/nonstaple inquiry to... mere ingredient would eliminate the ... inquiries relating
to whether what was actually sold was a material part of the invention and whether the
seller knew that what was actually sold was especially made or adapted for use in
infringement of the patent").
94. As discussed above, the inquiry into a technology's "substantial non-infringing
use" is unnecessary if the defendant can practicably distinguish between infringing and
non-infringing applications. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
95. Because both the district court and the Ninth Circuit treated this issue in dicta,
neither fully resolved the appropriate test for evaluating substantial non-infringing uses.
The two opinions, however, suggested very different approaches to the question. Judge
Patel found Napster's non-infringing uses insufficient because its service had no
"substantial or commercially significant" non-infringing applications. A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The Ninth Circuit, while
affirming on other grounds, took issue with Judge Patel's narrow view of Napster's noninfringing uses. In the Ninth Circuit's view, the inquiry into non-infringing uses must
contemplate both current and potential future uses of the defendant's technology. A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The district court
improperly confined the use analysis to current uses, ignoring the system's capabilities.").
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staple article of commerce arguments tend to focus narrowly on its
file-sharing software, it is quite likely that such software would have
been created even if only for non-infringing purposes, even if the
96
overall Napster service owes its existence to infringement.
Napster claims that an injunction requiring it to stop users'
infringement will ultimately shut down its service and hurt new artists
and others who want their music shared. That may or may not be
true; the answer is an empirical one on which I express no opinion.
But does it not make sense, when deciding whether to condemn such
a shutdown, to inquire into its actual effect on the public? If the
shutdown would deprive the public of a product whose non-infringing
applications would justify its development, then the copyright holder
that obtains an injunction is, indeed, meddling in technology market
and interfering with legitimate applications. But if it is solely the
infringement that justifies the formation of the market, is it not fair to
give copyright owners a share of it?97 A business enterprise whose
raison d'etre is infringement owes it to those who effectively fund its
operations to share in their proceeds.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Sony sought to strike a balance between
two consumer-oriented goals: the need to create incentives for
Under the approach set forth in this Essay, courts should consider potential non-infringing
uses, but only in order to decide whether the anticipated demand for such uses of the
technology, together with current demand for non-infringing uses, would justify the
development and distribution of the product or service at issue in the case. See supra note
92.
96. It is not unusual for courts to distinguish between lawful and unlawful behavior
based on the role that otherwise innocuous articles play in the defendant's particular
business enterprise. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1499, 1456
(C.D. Cal. 1996) ("[A]Ithough time-loaded cassettes can be used for legitimate purposes,
these purposes are insubstantial given the number of Mr. Abdallah's customers that were
using them for counterfeiting purposes."); see generallyPeople v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628,
633 (Ct. App. 1967) (stating that in criminal conspiracy cases, "Intent may be inferred
from knowledge, when the volume of business with the buyer is grossly disproportionate
to any legitimate demand, or when sales for illegal use amount to a high proportion of the
seller's total business. In such cases an intent to participate in the illegal enterprise may be
inferred from the quantity of business done.").
97. For technologies with proven, but insubstantial, non-infringing applications,
injunctive relief may give copyright holders unwarranted economic leverage and enable
them to capture the value of both infringing and non-infringing uses of the technology. In
such cases, courts may deny injunctive relief and impose damages based on the value of
the infringing uses. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 23, at 6:16; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at
493-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority in Sony for "confus[ing] the
question of liability with the difficulty of fashioning an appropriate remedy").
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creative expression, on the one hand, and the ,need to protect
competition in other unrelated areas of commerce, on the other. The
Court viewed the staple article of commerce doctrine as one means to
mediate between those sometimes competing goals. As stated by the
Court, the doctrine should limit copyright holders' rights against
equipment sellers when necessary to give consumers unimpeded
access to markets "substantially unrelated" to copyright infringement.
While a number of courts have applied Sony, few have done so
with an eye toward the Supreme Court's stated normative goals.
Consistent with Sony's core objectives, the market access paradigm
seeks to insulate technology when necessary to preserve unimpeded
consumer access to markets substantially unrelated to infringement.
This suggests a two stage inquiry: first, into the necessity of the
doctrine in preserving such markets; and second, into whether the
market at issue is indeed "substantially unrelated" to infringement.
This Essay does not pretend to resolve all of the challenges
presented by the Napster case or by Sony itself. Instead, it identifies
the general principles that should guide courts evaluating "staple
article of commerce" cases, and sketches the rough contours of their
implementation. As the Supreme Court recognized, the public does
not always benefit when technology prevails over copyright. This
essay proposes one possible means of striking a balance between the
two.

